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UNFAIR TRADING BY PRODUCT SIMULATION:
RULE OR RANKLE?
ERvIN H. POLLACK*
The flexibility of business morality in pursuit of trade has had
a retarding effect upon the development of superior rivalry standards.
Through the processes of judicial accretion, the law of unfair compe-
tition has developed asymmetrically, embodying a variety of eco-
nomic viewpoints. Since these opinions of the judiciary have reflected,
in turn, philosophies of business management and protection of public
interest, they have been, at times, both contradictory and confusing.'
From the long line of court decisions rendered during the past
century affecting American trade practices, certain basic legal con-
cepts have been formulated. The principle that it was wrong for a
businessman fraudulently to sell his goods as those of a competitor
was applied, initially, in cases involving misrepresentation by word
("passing off") or by conduct (wrongful appropriation of trade-
marks). This doctrine was extended to the copying of labels, pack-
ages, colors, wrappers, dress, and form and appearance of goods.
Inevitably, it was expanded to include other competitive practices,
which were designed to injure a rival's business. As one court ob-
served, "Unfair competition can exist in any endeavor to which
human ingenuity lends itself."2
However, the variety of judicial attitudes towards predatory and
unethical business practices has created disparate concepts. Thus, in
ruling on doubtful commercial conduct, the courts have variously
sought (1) to protect the honest businessman in the trade to which
he is fairly entitled,' (2) to punish the dishonest trader who attempts
to take away his competitor's business by unfair means,4 and (3) to
protect the public from deception and unfair business practices.5
Applying these dissimilar concepts, a number of theories have
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1 For a discussion of the economic philosophy of unfair competition see judge
Frank's concurring opinion in Standard Brands v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.
1945).
2 Pocket Books v. Meyers, 178 Misc. 59, 33 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
3 Smith, Kline and French Laboratories v. Clark and Clark, 62 F. Supp. 971
(D.N.J. 1945); Mark Realty Corp. v. Major Amusement Co., 180 App. Div. 549, 168
N.Y. Supp. 244 (1st Dep't 1917).
4 Ibid.
5 Stably, Inc. v. M. H. Jacobs Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1950); K. Taylor
Distilling Co. v. Food Center of St. Louis, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Mo. 1940);
Standard Brands v. Smidler, supra note 1.
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been formulated by the courts to prevent unconscionable simulation
of products. Notably, the courts are wary to permit the second comer
"a free ride" at the expense of the originator of a commodity. Thus,
if, in addition to the imitation of the originator's article, the second
comer needlessly creates the impression in the minds of buyers that
an originator is also the source of the simulated product, the courts
will enjoin such conduct as "an unlawful concomitant of the privileged
imitation."'
Associated with this relief in imitation cases is the correlative
concept of consumer protection, although protection of the consumer
has been limited to the prevention of confusion. Therefore, in invoking
the principle of public protection, the courts have strictly applied the
doctrine of secondary meaning and the attendant rule that the conduct
of the second comer must create a likelihood of confusion as to its
source if relief is to be granted.7
Equity also has extended its rules to restrain such unfair business
practices as palming off,' actual deception,9 or appropriation of
another's property," where these conditions are sufficient to invoke
judicial relief without proof of secondary meaning. However, some
courts, failing to distinguish between secondary meaning and other
business-conduct cases, have incorrectly assumed the demise of the
secondary meaning doctrine," although the rule still possesses vitality
and is actively applied.
6 American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber & Goldberg, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959).
7 3 Restatement, Torts § 741 (1938); Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d
395 (2d Cir. 1947).
8 Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling, 282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (3d
Dep't 1953); Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957).
9 Oneida, Ltd. v. National Silver Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Avon
Periodicals v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 282 App. Div. 200, 122 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1st Dep't
1953); Artype Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1956); Flint Co. v. Oleet
Jewelry Mfg. Co., 133 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
10 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Dior v.
Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 2 A.D.2d 878, 156
N.Y.S.2d 996 (1st Dep't 1956); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n. v. Wagner-Nichols Record
Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951).
11 E.g., Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug Co., 167 F. Supp. 427 (N.D.N.Y.
1958), reversed by 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959). But see, Hygienic Specialties Co. v.
H. G. Salzman, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), citing Santa's Workshop v.
Sterling, supra note 8, and Avon Periodicals v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co., supra note 9, as not
requiring a showing of secondary meaning. See also Noma Lites, Inc. v. Lawn Spray,
Inc., 130 F. Supp. 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 222 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1955). There
has been some confusion as to the essentiality of secondary meaning under New York
law, but Circuit Judge Moore's explanation in the Norwich Pharmacal Co. case, supra
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Unfortunately, the intransigence of the secondary meaning rule
raises serious questions as to its ethical adequacy in controlling mod-
ern business practices. This problem is further aggravated by con-
tinuing misinterpretation and growing confusion in the law of product
simulation. The contradictions are illustrated by the assumption of
secondary meaning or the application of varying degrees of proof,
by the formulation of the fraudulent marketing theory in the recent
American Safety Table Co. case' 2 and by the courts' misapplication of
the early Rushmore cases. 3 The purpose of this paper is to review
these vagaries of the law of product simulation and to attempt a
reassessment of the principles they embody.
THE MAJORITY RULE
The copying of nonfunctional features of an article which have
acquired a secondary meaning, with a resulting confusion as to
source or origin, constitutes unfair competition and will be enjoined
by the courts. 4 This is the majority rule reduced to its simplest
formula.
In determining whether the imitation of features of a product
should be enjoined, the courts initially are faced with the following
basic issue: 15 Are the imitated features functional or nonfunctional?
If they are functional, they are within the public domain and may
generally be copied in every detail.
On the other hand, if the simulated features are nonfunctional,
the fundamental issue is: Did the first comer establish a secondary
meaning so that the conduct to the second comer created a likelihood
of confusion as to the source of the simulated article?
Each of these questions presents a variety of problems with
contradictory and perplexing solutions. In order to assess them ad-
should eliminate it. Secondary meaning apparently continues as a requirement. However,
under California law, an inference of secondary meaning is created by proof of copying.
Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1960).
12 American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber & Goldberg, supra note 6.
13 Rushmore v. Saxon, 154 Fed. 213 (2d Cir. 1907); 158 Fed. 499 (2d Cir. 1908);
Rushmore v, Manhattan Screw and Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939 (2d Cir. 1908);
Rushmore v. Saxon, 170 Fed. 1021 (2d Cir. 1909); Rushmore v. Badger Brass Mfg. Co.,
198 Fed. 379 (2d Cir. 1912).
'4 Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917); Sinko
v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1939); Rathbone, Sard & Co. v. Champion
Steel Range Co., 189 Fed. 26 (6th Cir. 1911); West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping
Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1955).
15 For a more elaborate discussion, see Pollack, "A Projection for the Revaluation
of Unfair Competition," 13 Ohio State LJ. 187, 216 (1952).
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equately, the issues have been reviewed here in accordance with the
normal processes of jural determination.
The first question presented is whether the imitated features are
functional or nonfunctional.
Imitation has been described as "the life blood of competition."1
It is the free flow of competitive, like commodities that fixes prices
and forestalls undesirable monopolistic conditions. Except for the
limited monopoly placed on original creativity under patent, copy-
right, and trade-mark laws, the simple imitation of another's product,
under certain conditions, is permissibleY. As Judge Learned Hand
identified the problem, "Under the guise of protecting against unfair
competition, we must be jealous not to create perpetual monopolies." 8
Thus, functional features of unpatented or uncopyrighted articles may
be freely copied by competitors.
Although it is easy to articulate this proposition, it is very difficult,
at times, to determine which features are functional.19 Judicial
characterizations of features as functional or nonfunctional, grounded
on differing definitions and policies, have resulted in conflicting clas-
sifications of the same or similar features.2 0
Some courts require the second comer to eliminate any con-
fusion resulting from the imitation of functional features by distin-
16 American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber & Goldberg, op. cit. supra note 6, at 272.
17 Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266
(7th Cir. 1943); Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 67 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1933).
18 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960, 964 (2d Cir. 1918).
19 The classification is further complicated by the various definitions given to
functional features. The significant definitions are:
a. Functional features are those which, in an engineering sense, are essential to
the construction of a commodity. Lekto-Shave Corp. v. General Shaver Corp., 92
F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1937).
b. Functional features are those which are commercially essential to the pro-
duction of a marketable commodity. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
111 (1938), rehearing denied, 305 U.S. 674 (1938).
c. Functional features are those which have attained consumer acceptance and
are desirable to the buyer. Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 26 F. Supp. 183
(E.D. Pa. 1938), aff'd, 106 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1939).
20 Numerous illustrations of this confusion are available. For example, when goods
are purchased largely for their aesthetic qualities, their design or style has been identified
as functional by some courts. Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., ibid. Hence,
the contour of a bottle or container, because of its attractive design, may, under
this interpretation, be functional, although the contents could be held equally as well
in another receptacle. On the other hand, if the functional features were determined
solely by their essentiality in an engineering sense, the contour of the bottle would be
classified as nonfunctional.
For a discussion, see Pollack, "A Projection for the Revaluation of Unfair
Competition," 13 Ohio St. L.J. 187, 208 (1952).
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guishing his product through the addition of some arbitrary nonfunc-
tional feature or nonessential mark.2' On the other hand, other courts
have held the opposing view that a burden should not be imposed,
either by requiring a change in the appearance of the article or by
adding unreasonably to the expense of its production and thus pro-
viding the first comer with a significant advantage and substantially
handicappng his competitors.2
Through this development of the law, predatory practices have
been condoned by the courts in the name of competition. However,
the courts, in evaluating unfair practices, have failed to distinguish be-
tween situations where a threat to competition would prevail and
where none exists. Thus, where the complainant and the defendant
are the only manufacturers of a commodity, concern over monopolistic
control should justifiably countervail unscrupulous conduct. But, if
the complainant is in competition with other manufacturers, the
monopolistic threat is unfounded, and, without doing competitive harm,
the unfair practice could be disallowed under a more liberal doctrine.
Unfortunately, the courts have taken only a broadside approach to
the diverse problems, without recognizing such distinctions.
The second question raised is, if the imitated features are non-
functional, did the first comer establish a secondary meaning?
The doctrine of secondary meaning requires that the appearance
of an article has become associated in the public mind with the first
comer as manufacturer or source.23 Thus, as Judge Learned Hand so
clearly stated in the leading Crescent case:
* . ' if a second comer imitates the article exactly, . . . the
public will believe his goods have come from the first, and will
buy, in part, at least, because of that deception. Therefore it
is apparent that it is an absolute condition to any relief whatever
that the plaintiff in such cases show that the appearance of his
wares has in fact come to mean that some particular person-the
plaintiff may not be individually known-makes them, and that
the public cares who does make them, and not merely for their
appearance and structure.2 4
The application of the secondary meaning doctrine, under which
relief is contingent upon a demonstration that the public associates
21 J. C. Penny Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941);
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A. R. Mosler & Co., 233 Fed. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); 1
Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade Marks 371 (4th ed. 1947); 3 Restate-
ment Torts § 741(b)(ii)(1938); Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., supra
note 18.
22 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., ibid.
23 Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., op. cit. supra note 14, at 300.
24 Ibid.
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the product with its source, rather than with the goods,2 is subject
to increasing criticism. This point is especially apparent in trade name
cases, where the principle serves as a mere fiction, since the interest
protected is not in the association of the article with its origin but
in its name for which there is a created demand.
Thus, Judge Crane of the New York Court of Appeals realisti-
cally argued that when "Uneeda biscuits or Cremo cigars or talcum
powder" are purchased, the buyer does not have the producer in
mind.26 The corporate structure of the producer is vague and nebulous
in the public mind, as is the producer's interest which may be trans-
ferred from one company to another. The public interest or good
will in the article is associated with the specific name given it which,
through advertising and general acceptance, has become popular. In
the absence of a trade-mark, it is a formidable requirement to insist
upon an association as to source which, by the very nature of the
relationship of the purchaser to the producer and the product, makes
for great difficulty in establishing secondary meaning.
The incongruity of the association as to source principle is fur-
ther demonstrated by cases involving the title of a book, a play or a
song. The general proposition is that an author, a playwright or a
composer has no inherent right to the title of his publication.2 7
Only when the title acquires secondary meaning, which identifies it in
the public mind with the work, is the creator entitled to its exclusive
use. 2 However, this principle is contrary to the rule that the article
must be associated in the public mind with the source or origin of
the product rather than with the goods if relief is to be given. In the
publication cases, inconsonant with the secondary meaning rule,
protection is contingent upon identification with the product-the
book, the play or the song-and the producer's participation is not
even remotely considered.
25 See Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., op. cit. supra note 14, at 453 where the court
declares ". . . Sinko created a desire on the part of the public for one of two things,
either for knobs made by Sinko, above all other knob makers, or for knobs made
in a particular manner regardless of who made them. If it is the first situation, the law
of unfair competition gives Sinko the right to monopolize or to exclude other makers
from copying the product. If it is the latter situation, Sinko receives no such right to
monopolize, even though he might have been the first one to make the article in the
particularly desirable manner." For a criticism of this doctrine, see Galbally, "Unfair
Trade in the Simulation of Rival Goods," 3 Villan. L. Rev. 333 (1958).
26 See Judge Crane's dissent in Gotham Music Service, Inc. v. Denton and Haskins
Music Pub. Co., 259 N.Y. 86, 181 N.E. 57 (1932), rehearing denied, 259 N.Y. 629, 182
N.E. 211 (1932).
27 Jackson v. Universal International Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433
(1950).
28 Ibid.
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Similarly, the inadequacy of the source test was recently illus-
trated by the New York Supreme Court in a suit involving the name
of a phonograph record company.Y9 The action was brought to restrain
the defendants' use of the name "Glad Record Company." The court
recognized the word "glad" as being in the public domain, available
to all, and in the absence of a showing of secondary meaning, dismissed
the suit. The defendants were Lionel Hampton, an orchestra leader,
and his wife, and the court admitted that "deception would be well
nigh impossible, the interest of the user being in the artist rather than
the artisan, the performer rather than the record producer."30
The ineffectuality of the requirement of public confusion as to
source has been demonstrated further where an injunction was denied
when allegedly the plaintiff's cartoon strip, rather than the name of
the featured character, had been appropriated.3 1 The Second Circuit,
interpreting the doctrine strictly, reasoned that since the public inter-
est in the cartoon characters was in their entertainment quality and
the source was a matter of general indifference, a claim of public
deception could not stand. "In the case of these silly pictures nobody
cares who is the producer-least of all children who are the chief
readers; the 'strips' sell because they amuse and please, and they
amuse and please because they are what they are, not because they
come from 'Detective.' 1132 A differentiation between cartoon characters,
in which the public maintains no interest as to source, and other
characters, in which it does, has been subject to criticism, since it
roots the problem in an inconclusively subjective evaluation of the
characters.33 In this situation, the essence of the matter is iri the
nature of the appropriator's misconduct and the resultant harm done
to his business competitor, rather than in an unelicitable quality of
public responsiveness to the acts.
Thus, the consequences of the reinforcement of the underpin-
ning of the court's actions, by dissimilar postulates, are discernible.
Where the essentiality of relief is related to the protection of the pub-
lic from deception, identification as to source is a prerequisite. But
where the public is indifferent to the source of the product, protection
is not provided, notwithstanding the harm done the complainant by
unfair, predatory practices.
On the other hand, where relief is allowed in an effort to pro-
29 Schwartz v. Hampton, 219 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1961).
30 Id. at 108.
31 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594
(2d Cir. 1951), opinion clarified, 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952).
32 Id. at 603.
33 Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 349, 354-355 (1954).
[Vol. 23
1962] UNFAIR TRADE BY PRODUCT SIMULATION 81
tect the honest businessman in the trade to which he is fairly entitled,
association as to source in the public mind is relegated to a less im-
portant position. This is consonant with the trend of the law to
broaden the range of unfair trade practices by enforcing higher
standards of business morality.34
It would appear, from the courts' adoption of the association as
to source doctrine, that the attitude of the buyers should be decisive
in determining whether the first comer has, in the public mind, success-
fully identified himself with the product. But such is not always the
case, for some courts have held that buyers are seldom reliable inter-
preters of their mental reactions. 5
Ancillary to the doctrine of secondary meaning is the concept
of establishing a likelihood of confusion, but this rule, also, is charged
with both substantive and procedural vagaries. The general rule is
that where a manufacturer of a product has established that secondary
meaning has been associated by the public with the article, protection
from others who would simulate it is not dependent upon a showing
of actual instances of confusion of the public, but upon a showing of
a likelihood of confusion.36 It has been established that confusion does
not stem merely from similarity or even identity of an article with that
of the originator's, but "it must be a confusion of manufacture and
relate to that which attaches to the personality of the manufacturer. ' 37
34 However, the law, as in the case of the biological sciences, has its atavistic
reversals. See Professor Walter J. Derenberg's criticism of the ultra-conservative approach
reflected in Judge Learned Hand's recent opinion in American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman,
275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1960), in contrast with the earlier observation of the Restatement
of Torts that the trend of the law "has been in the direction of enforcing increasingly
higher standards of fairness or commercial morality in trade." Restatement, Torts,
Introduction, Note chap. 35, at 540 (1938). Derenberg, "The Thirteenth Year of Admin-
istration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946," 126 U.S.P.Q. No. 8, Part II, 31-32
(1960); 50 Trademark Rep. 773, 848-849 (1960).
35 Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn. 1934).
Contra, see Skinner Mfg. Co. v. General Foods Sales Co., 52 F. Supp. 432 (D. C.
Neb. 1943), aff'd, 143 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 766 (1944) and
Steem-Electric Corp. v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 118 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1940), where
the testimony of consumers is given greater weight than that of dealers, experts and other
specialists.
3 6 Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp. 194 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1952).
37 Columbus Plastic Products v. Rona Plastic Corp. 111 F. Supp. 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
What constitutes likelihood of confusion to one judge may be identified as a total
absence of confusion by another. The standards are variable and inconstant; however,
several factors, directly or indirectly, influence judicial determination. The first relates
to the person the court is seeking to protect. Is he a "reasonably prudent" consumer?-
the "ordinary" consumer?-the "less intelligent" consumer?-or the "most ignorant" con-
sumer? Compare the descriptions in the Rushmore cases, supra note 13, with that in
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However, the courts have not applied this doctrine with any con-
sistency or uniformity. This is illustrated by the Briddell case3"
where, in his dessent, Judge Charles E. Clark points to the court's
contradictory conclusion that in practice there must be a showing of
actual confusion if relief is to be granted, notwithstanding the rule
that only a likelihood of confusion need be demonstrated. 9 As Judge
Clark observed, this is "new" law, but the practice is not novel. In
seeking relief from the imitation of nonfunctional features of articles,
complainants frequently attempt to establish confusion by introducing
evidence of actual deception, notwithstanding the less rigorous re-
quirements of the law. This practice is generally followed, although
it is more difficult to prove actual confusion, since the courts, quite
naturally, give greater weight to such evidence.4"
The ineffectuality of this "likelihood of confusion" rule is fur-
ther illustrated by the recent case of American-Marietta Co. v.
Krigsman.41 In this decision, Judge Hand restricted the doctrine
further by insisting that "one who seeks to enjoin the reproduction of
what is in the public domain must affirmatively show that the copied
features were the reason for the confusion; it is not enough that
perhaps it may (emphasis not supplied) have contributed ....,"
Judge Hand argued that there was no evidence to suggest that the
copied nonfunctional features misled buyers. However, if the courts
were to conform to his insistance upon proof of actual confusion, the
"likelihood" rule would become inoperative and moribund.
Should the confusion test relate solely to the disputed features,
as prescribed by Judge Hand, or should it apply to the whole article
with its differences and resemblances? Courts generally use the lat-
ter tests to determine whether the copying is sufficient to mislead the
public. Thus, the differences and resemblances of the products are
analyzed, and, in this connection, three distinct tests have been
applied.
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 Fed. 37 (2d Cir. 1907). The result in a case will
depend significantly on what class of consumer the court is willing to protect. E. Kahn's
Sons Co. v. Columbus Packing Co., 82 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1936) (ordinary purchasers);
Bechik Products, Inc. v. Federal Silk Mills, Inc., 135 F. Supp. (D. Md. 1955) (sophisti-
cated purchasers). A second consideration which affects the determination of likelihood
of confusion relates to the nature of the simulated product. Is it an automobile lamp or
a bar of soap? It is a luxury or a necessity? To what economic or social class does it
appeal?
38 Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., supra note 36.
39 Id. at 422.
40 Nims, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1047.
41 275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1960).
42 Id. at 290.
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One theory is that there is no simulation if the differences are
more discernible to the ordinary buyer than the resemblances. 4 3 The
second test is that simulation is not determinable by detailed descrip-
tions of the differences after careful comparison of the articles, but
rather by the resemblance between them. 4 By this theory, resem-
blances may be applied to both functional and nonfunctional features.
The third procedure requires an examination of "the points of differ-
ence and resemblance as a whole and not merely the points of resem-
blance."45 Attending differences and distinctions arise from the ap-
plication of these dissimilar rules.
The doctrine of secondary meaning is unresponsive to the eth-
ical requirements of modern commercial practices, being discursive
in its content and furtive in its application. These discordancies may
be attributed to the rule's theoretical vacuity and formalism, and sug-
gest a need for doctrinal clarification and change. Regrettably, com-
panion theories have developed with equal indeterminateness and
irresolution.
FRAUDULENT MARKETING
In American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber & Goldberg,46 a
recent two-to-one decision, the Second Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals departed from the majority rule which it had helped
to create and develop. As dissenting Judge Charles E. Clark observed,
by masking its opinion in a welter of detail, the Court parlayed a weak,
simple, expired patent into a perpetual monopoly. Without disputing
the finding of the district court that the plaintiff's machine had not
acquired a secondary meaning, Judge Medina found in "improper
and deceitful marketing methods" grounds for injunctive relief.
The Court, in this novel decision, stated that the production and
marketing activities must be considered together. "While both produc-
tion and marketing at heart deal with confusion as to source, . . .
different elements and different policy considerations are involved in
each . . ."4 The Court further stated that with the copying of the
machine in every detail, the use of plaintiff's parts in machines
marketed by the defendants, the dissemination of misleading adver-
tising, and several instances of customer confusion in making com-
43 James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel and Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6 (6th Cir.
1942).
44 Pocket Books, Inc. v. Myers, 292 N.Y. 58, 65, 54 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1944), dissenting
opinion of Judge Rippey.
45 American Automobile Assn. v. American Automobile Owners Assn., 216 Cal. 125,
138, 13 P.2d 707, 713 (1932).
46 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.) Cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959).
47 Id. at 271.
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plaints, seeking replacements, and requesting repairs, a fraudulent
scheme evolved which became actionable.
Twice in his opinion, Judge Medina indicated that secondary
meaning need not be the controlling consideration,48 and "in view of
the deliberate plan to poach unjustifiably on [plaintiff's] goodwill,"
the Court was not "disposed to debate in detail the probabilities of
confusion [as to source] .,9 The Court concluded "that the fraudulent
scheme as a whole must be condemned. Because joined with improper
and deceitful marketing methods the making of the Chinese copies
becomes unlawful, in the absence of the taking of reasonable and
proper steps by . . . [the defendants] to distinguish their machines
from the [plaintiff's].""
In the absence of secondary meaning, what were the deceitful
marketing methods which, combined with the simulation of the
machine, made the conduct actionable? Judge Clark, in his discerning
dissent, criticized the sophisticated employment by the majority of
descriptive emotive words, as "poach," "deceitful," and "fraudulent,"
without relating them to specific facts. He argued that the record did
not support the specific charges of misconduct, except for the copying
of the machine itself.51
After analyzing each of the several acts which constituted the
enjoinable combination, Judge Clark concluded that the practices
were not unfair. He observed that the defendants made no serious
attempt to hire away plaintiff's employees, a fact conceded by the
majority. The inferences drawn from the sale, by the defendants, of
numerous machines, containing plaintiff's used parts, were unjustified,
since the record reveals that the machines were sold as rebuilt
instruments.
The majority gave special attention to the defendants' so-called
fraudulent advertising. But, as Judge Clark observed, "the majority's
own opinion, as well as the fact that the trial court did not think
plaintiff's charges here sufficiently serious to warrant specific findings,
amply reveals the state of the record in support of this claim."52
Finally, the unfair practices are reduced to merely the copying
of the machine. This copying is repeatedly condemned by the
majority, but it acknowledges that in the absence of palming off,
deceit, or secondary meaning, the second comer is privileged to copy
48 Id. at 273, 276.
49 Id. at 276.
50 Ibid.
51 Id. at 281.
52 Ibid.
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a product.53 In fact, had the defendants been guilty of fraudulent
advertising, only that fraudulent activity and not the copying of the
plaintiff's machine should have been enjoined. 4
There is a dangerous inconsistency in the Court's refusal to
acknowledge secondary meaning as a controlling consideration, al-
though admitting it to be a criterion. The nebulous, fraudulent mar-
keting theory, projected in the majority opinion, would vitiate all
criteria by which unfair trade practices might be measured.
The basis for injunctive relief, under this theory, would rest on
a melange of jural attitudes and biases, which the courts could ration-
alize by the use of descriptive terminology. The hazards and uncer-
tainties of this legal course suggest the need for a greater specificity
in the law of unfair competition.
Judge Clark's final comment on the case was that he could not
"perceive the reason or occasion for this decision,"" a view with which
this writer concurs.
53 Paramount Industries v. Solar Products Corp., 186 F.2d 999, 1001-1002 (2d Cir.
1951).
In Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., supra note 11, decided after the
American Safety Table Co. case by the same court but different judges, this point is
emphatically emphasized.
54 See Judge Clark's dissent in American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber & Goldberg,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 281. See also Frank M. Shaw, Inc. v. C. H. Cleworth & Associ-
ates, Inc., 110 U.S.P.Q. 394 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956); International Latex Corp. v. Schein-
bert, 263 App. Div. 861, 32 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1st Dep't 1942); American Chicle Co. v. W.
J. White Chicle Co., 196 Fed. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1912); Noma Lites, Inc. v. Lawn Spray,
Inc., 130 F. Supp. 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd 222 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1955).
In the Noma Lites, Inc. case, a preliminary injunction was granted by the District
Court, without proof of secondary meaning, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, for
copying advertising. The Court of Appeals expressed no opinion as to whether on the
actual trial secondary meaning could or could not be shown. But see, Jack Daniel
Distillery, Inc. v. Hoffman Distilling Co., 190 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ky. 1960). Because
of confidential relationship between the parties, the plaintiff's attack might conceivably
have been directed at misappropriation of property rights rather than secondary mean-
ing. Franke v. Wilached, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953). For a comprehensive analysis
of the misappropriation cases, see Judge Palmieri's opinion in Continental Casualty Co.
v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 43-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), af'd, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
55 American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber & Goldberg, op. cit. supra note 6, at 282.
On an appeal of the interlocutory judgment in the American Safety Table Co. case,
287 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1961), Judge Medina retreated markedly from his original position.
He denied that the case was intended as a departure from the basic principles of the
law of unfair competition. However, this assertion is difficult to reconcile with the
doctrinal innovations of his original opinion. Judge Medina further asserted that the
court did not intend to establish a perpetual monopoly in the complainant, for the
defendants could continue to manufacture collar pressing machines if reasonable means
were employed to distinguish between the machines. But, despite his disavowal, requiring
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THE RUSHm OE DOCTRINE
The Rushmore cases 6 are cited for the minority doctrine that if
the copying of nonfunctional features is likely to deceive consumers,
the simulation will be enjoined.57 This departure from the prevailing
view permits injunctive relief without a showing of secondary meaning
and is recognized by some authorities." However, the writer is of
the opinion that the Rushmore cases do not support this broad minor-
ity view. An analysis of these cases reveals that they cannot be
differentiated from secondary meaning decisions and that only erro-
neously did they form the basis for the so-called minority doctrine.
Such a study makes it apparent that secondary meaning, which
is presupposed, is not eliminated as an essential element under the
Rushmore doctrine, but merely that proof of secondary meaning is
excluded. The policy-objectives of the courts are the same, which are
to safeguard the quality of competitive practices. The right to
compete, with an attending instrumentality of imitation, is outweighed
by the countervailing opposition to deception of the public. In essence,
the Rushmore doctrine manifests only a procedural variation of the
majority rule and, as to substantive content, does not stand distinc-
tively apart from it.
An appraisal of the merits of the doctrine warrants a fuller ex-
position of the Rushmore decisions. The three Rushmore cases, which
were decided in the early part of the present century, resulted in five
written opinions. It was from these cases, and particularly the second
decision, that the doctrine derived its name.
The plaintiff in the Rushmore cases was the designer and first
manufacturer of an unpatented ornamental lamp, with a new and
distinctive outer shell shape. Principally ornamental, the shell con-
sisted of arbitrary curves, beads and lines. Widely exhibited and
advertised as the Rushmore "Flare Front" lamp, the device carried
an attached plate, giving the plaintiff's name.
defendants to distinguish their product from their competitor's, in the absence of a
showing of secondary meaning, is new law for the Second Circuit.
56 Rushmore cases, supra note 13.
57 Grant v. California Bench Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 706, 707-708, 173 P.2d 817, 818
(1946).
58 3 Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 1259 (2d ed.
1950).
"With regard to the imitation of non-functional features the law is unsettled. One
line of authorities holds that the imitation of non-functional features is illegal if the
similarity is likely to deceive purchasers . . . and the other states that one may freely copy
the non-functional features ... if they have not become associated with the original
manufacturer or source . . . ." Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Waldman, 69 F.
Supp. 646, 647 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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The first Rushmore case, decided in 1907 by the Circuit Court
for the Southern District of New York, was brought by the designer
against a man named Saxon. 9 The defendant had copied the Rush-
more lamp in exact detail, even including its imperfections. However,
the defendant's lamp being of a lighter metal and of poorer crafts-
manship, could be sold cheaper than the Rushmore lamp. The
defendant placed his own name plate, written in script similar to
Rushmore's, in exactly the same location as the Rushmore plate. In
addition, the defendant advertised his lamps as "Flare Front" and
sold them to customers as Rushmore lamps.
Rushmore sought a preliminary injunction to restrain Saxon
from using the words "Flare Front" and also from simulating the
details of his lamp. In denying the preliminary injunction, Judge
Lacombe commented, in regard to "Flare Front," that it would
"require a fuller presentment of the facts than is possible by affidavits
to enable the court to determine whether they have acquired a second-
ary meaning." ° (Emphasis added.)
As to the features of the shell, the judge was unable at the
preliminary hearing to determine whether they were functional or non-
functional, but significantly, he spoke of secondary meaning in relation
to the pertinent trade name.
At the final hearing on the case, the plaintiff's request for an
injunction was granted in full.6' The court concluded that the partic-
ular form and appearance of the external parts of the lamp were
nonfunctional.
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
simulated the features for the purpose of "securing the advantages of
the reputation of complainant's lamps and the existing demand there-
for. 6 2 (Emphasis added.) The court supported the plaintiff's allega-
tion, stating:
Evidently the purpose was to copy in design and appearance
to the smallest detail the Rushmore lamp, and induce users and
purchasers and the trade, so far as possible, to think this was a
Rushmore lamp and purchase and use it as such. 3
The court quoted from the opinion in Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, 4
involving a similar factual situation, in which the simulated features
were termed "well-known and distinctive."
60 Rushmore v. Saxon, 154 Fed. 213 (2d Cir. 1907).
00 Ibid.
01 Rushmore v. Saxon, 158 Fed. 499 (2d Cir. 1908).
62 Id. at 500.
63 Id. at 504.
64 131 Fed. 240 (2d Cir. 1904).
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Despite the court's failure in the Rushmore case, when speaking
about the nonfunctional features, to articulate specifically confusion
as to source, the inference is clear that it was assessing the question of
the existence of secondary meaning. Excerpts from the opinion seem
to substantiate this judgment.
Rushmore deemed it wise to design an ornamental and dis-
tinctive inclosing shell for his lamps for automobiles, which would
give notice and a guarantee to his customers that they were
securing the Rushmore lamp.65
The lamp in question . . . is a superior and popular search
light .... 16
That his acts led to confusion in the trade and among pur-
chasers and users is self-evident. The results could not be other-
wise.6
The complainant also produced the testimony of other wit-
nesses tending to show, and showing to my satisfaction, that persons
were confused and misled and deceived, and that they naturally
would be . . . :8
It might reasonably be concluded from these quotations that the
court presumed the existence of an association of the distinctive non-
functional features with the plaintiff as manufacturer. If this assump-
tion is warranted, the Rushmore case includes the elements essential
to the majority rule-the simulation of nonfunctional features which
have acquired a secondary meaning, absent its proof, with a resulting
confusion as to source or origin. 69
This reasoning is further substantiated by the court's reliance
upon secondary meaning in its consideration of the question of the
defendant's copying of the trade name of the plaintiff. After clearly
identifying secondary meaning as an essential element in the simu-
lation of trade name cases, the court found that Rushmore had
established secondary meaning in the words "Flare Front," that the
defendant had "palmed off" his lamp as that of the complainant by
the use of this trade name, and that consumers had thereby been
deceived. It seems very unlikely that the court would expressly require
secondary meaning as a condition for relief in the trade name aspect
65 Rushmore v. Saxon, op. cit. supra note 61, at 502.
66 Ibid.
67 Id. at 505.
68 Id. at 504.
69 In addition to the simulation of the nonfunctional features, the case involved the
passing off of the defendant's lamps as "Rushmore" lamps. The court should have
distinguished this conduct from the actual copying, for an injunction could lie to
prohibit the passing off without considering the element of secondary meaning. However,
the issue of passing off is not germane to the immediate problem before us.
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of the case, but would ignore or reject it as an element in considering
the nonfunctional features of the product°.
7
The court's application of the doctrine of secondary meaning in
the first Rushmore case was recognized ten years later by Judge
Learned Hand, although he characterized the holding "as trenching
hard" upon the converse application of secondary meaning in appear-
ance cases where functional features are involved."' Since the appli-
cable features were not classified by the Rushmore court in the first
preliminary hearing as to their functional or nonfunctional attributes,
Judge Hand's conclusion is questionable. In contrast, the evidence
strongly supports his relating secondary meaning to the first Rush-
more case.
The second Rushmore case, the most important of the five
decisions, is most frequently cited and reputedly gave rise to the
Rushmore doctrine.72 It appears that the doctrine stems from a
commercially written editorial headnote to the court's opinion, since
the essence of the doctrine is not stated in the opinion proper, nor
is it mentioned by the dissenting judge, although it is embodied in
the syllabus of the case. The headnote reads:
One who manufactures and sells a well-known article of com-
merce, like an automobile search light, inclosed in a shell of
graceful but unpatented design, may maintain a bill of injunction,
profits, and damages against a defendant who sells an automobile
search light inclosed in a similar shell, although his name appears
prominently thereon as maker, and he has never represented that
his lamps were made by complainant, if it is shown the the simi-
larity of the shells does, or is likely to deceive purchasers. (Em-
phasis added.)
The words "likely to deceive" are frequently quoted in later
opinions, which serve as the basis for the Rushmore doctrine. How-
ever, the doctrine is a broadened concept, interposed by and rooted
in an initially incorrect syllabus.73
Apart from the inaccuracy of the headnote, the "likelihood of
deception" phrase has been taken completely out of context by later
courts. The syllabus clearly states that the Rushmore automobile
search light was a "well-known article of commerce." In addition,
70 This case was finally appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit;
however, since chronology plays an important role in the Rushmore cases, it is desirable
to consider an intervening decision of the Second Circuit before viewing the final
disposition of the case.
71 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., supra note 18.
72 Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw and Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939 (2d Cir. 1908).
73 It is common knowledge that the American lawyer and judge often rely solely
upon editorial headnotes as though they were authoritative statements of positive law.
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these words were used twice in Judge Coxe's published opinion. In
one reference, he quotes the district court opinion which mentioned
"well-known lamps." 74 He then repeats the words, when he says,
"We are thus confronted with the naked question of law-can one
who manufactures and sells a well-known article of commerce ...
maintain a bill for injunction . . . ?171 (Emphasis added.) This
language strongly implies that the consuming public associated the
features of the Rushmore lamp with the complainant as manufacturer.
Thus, Judge Coxe assumed the existence of the elements which con-
stitute secondary meaning. Only the proof to establish these facts
is omitted.
A re-examination of the opinion of the court reveals that the
judge is doubtful of the presence of "passing off."
There are allegations in the bill, made upon information and
belief, that the defendant has palmed off its lamps upon innocent
purchasers as the Rushmore lamp, but there is nothing in the affi-
davits worthy of the name of evidence to establish these alle-
gations. 76
So far then as the prayer for an injunction is based upon the
use of the name "Flare Front" and the allegation that the defend-
ant has actually deceived purchasers by representing that its lamps
were made by the complainant, the most that can be said is that
the questions are involved in doubt.77
Where doubt exists, the courts have uniformly held that an injunction
should not issue.
Thus, Judge Coxe distinguishes between "passing off" 78 -oral
misrepresentations made to prospective buyers-and deception created
by the simulation of nonfunctional features, relying upon the latter
principle to invoke a preliminary injunction, but later in his opinion
the judge varies the consistency of his approach.
[I]t is not easy to understand how such fastidious buyers
with the Phoebus name plate before them can be deceived into
thinking that they are purchasing the Rushmore lamp.79
74 Id. at 941.
75 Id. at 942.
76 Id. at 941.
77 Ibid.
78 Some courts have broadened the definition of "passing off" to include the copying
of nonfunctional features of a product which the public associates with the manufacturer;
tions. E.g., Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, op. cit. supra note 64, at 240. The writer
prefers to limit the meaning of "passing off" to verbal misrepresentations, thus avoiding
the problem of semantic confusion. This distinction is consistent with the reasoning of
Judge Moore in Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug Co., 271 F.2d 569, 571 (2d
Cir. 1959).
79 Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw and Stamping Works, op. cit. supra note 72, at
942.
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If the purchasers' observation of the details of the physical
features as well as the trade name was casual, the deception doctrine
should have stood as to both, but Judge Coxe recognized that the
buyers were discriminating and not likely to be deceived by the
different name plates.
If that were correct, why should an injunction be allowed solely
because of the imitation of the nonfunctional features? Would simu-
lation, despite the fastidious buyers' probable inspection of the name
plate, create confusion in the buyers' minds? It does not seem likely
that there is a high probability of deception in simulation cases while
in trade name cases there is a low probability of deception. The test
of deception should be applied by viewing the article in its totality
rather than segmentally by separating the various features. In such
circumstances, where the purchasers are discriminating, the identifi-
cation of the imitating article by a distinctive name should be sufficient
to justify a denial of an injunction.
The Rushmore court disposes of the trade name "Flare Front"
with apparent ease by identifying it as descriptive words, holding that
an injunction should not issue without a showing that the words have
acquired a secondary meaning. Again, it appears improbable that the
court would expressly identify secondary meaning with regard to
one phase of the case and not with the other.
Even the dissenting opinion of Judge Noyes supports the con-
clusion that this landmark case does not differ from the majority rule,
except as it applies evidentiary proof. As he suggests, ". . . the
essential element is deception-the palming off of one's goods as
those of another." s°
The first Rushmore case was appealed to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals and the decision was modified to conform to the
decision in the preceding Rushmore holding."'
In the third and final Rushmore case, a per curiam decision was
rendered by the Second Circuit in 1912.82 The facts were essentially
the same as in the previous cases and once again the court granted an
injunction restraining the simulation of the external features of com-
plainant's lamp. 3
80 Ibid. But note that Judge Noyes failed to distinguish between passing off and
deception.
81 Rushmore v. Saxon, 170 Fed. 1021 (2d Cir. 1909).
82 Rushmore v. Badger Brass Mfg. Co., 198 Fed. 379 (2d Cir. 1912).
83 Judge Noyes, who dissented in the Manhattan Works case, joined Judges Coxe
and Ward in the court's opinion. This patent inconsistency may be explained because
the injunction in the Manhattan Works case was granted preliminarily before a full
hearing.
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The third Rushmore case is in accord with the other Rushmore
decisions in that no mention of secondary meaning is made in the
opinion. Nonetheless, it again appears that the existence of secondary
meaning was assumed by the court. The inference can be drawn that
the court assumed that the complainant's lamp had acquired a second-
ary meaning. This is reflected in the court's statement:
He [a consumer] sees a speedometer, a lamp, a clock, or some
other of the numerous motor car attachments, which is pleasing
to the eye, and, having ascertained the name of the maker, resolves
to have it on his car.84 (Emphasis added.)
The concurrence of the Rushmore cases with the majority doc-
trine can be illustrated further by an analysis of the two earlier
decisions of the Second Circuit which the Rushmore cases consistently
cite as controlling authority. These cases, Enterprise Mfg. v. Landers5
and Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder,"8 do not support a doctrine
distinct from the majority view, although they have been cited for
the proposition that secondary meaning is not a required element,
where relief is based on a simulation of nonfunctional features.
In the Enterprise case, the plaintiff had long been engaged in
the manufacture and sale of grinding mills.
Complainant and its predecessors have for thirty years been
engaged in the manufacture and sale of a line of mills for grinding
coffee, drugs, etc., of varying sizes; adopting therefor a certain
characteristic shape, design, color, and ornamentation, which have
become well known to purchasers, and associated in their minds
with the goods of complainant.87 (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff's request for an injunction restraining the defendants
from copying its coffee mill was granted by the court. Although the
court did not expressly discuss secondary meaning, its existence as
a required element is clearly shown from the statements in the opinion:
[W]hen the simulation of well-known and distinctive fea-
tures is so close, the court will assume that defendants intended the
result they have accomplished, and will find an intent to appropri-
ate the trade of their competitor, even though ... they may caution
against oral misrepresentations as to the manufacture of the goods.
[A] court of equity will not allow a man to palm off his goods
as those of another, whether his misrepresentations are made by
word of mouth, or, more subtly, by simulating the collocation of
details of appearance by which the consuming public has come to
recognize the product of his competitor.88 (Emphasis added.)
84 Id. at 380.
85 Supra note 64. See also lower court decision, 124 Fed. 923 (2d Cir. 1903).
86 154 Fed. 37 (2d Cir. 1907).
87 Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, op. cit. supra note 64, at 240.
88 Id. at 241.
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Rudolf Callmann, in a footnote to his treatise on The Law of
Unfair Competition and Trade-marks, cites the Enterprise case as
authority for the majority rule, commenting: "Courts often cite this
case [Enterprise case] in support of the [Rushmore] rule . . . ; but
this interpretation seems erroneous." 9
In the Crescent case, Judge Learned Hand observed that "The
cases of so-called 'nonfunctional' unfair competition, starting with
the 'coffee mill case,' Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers . . are only
instances of the doctrine of 'secondary' meaning."9 Nonetheless, the
court's failure, in the Enterprise case, to specify the requirement of
secondary meaning seemed to provide a basis for its identification in
support of the deception doctrine.
Callmann's discussion of the Enterprise case is in apparent accord
with this interpretation; however, he takes an inconsistent stand in
explaining the Rushmore cases, with their similar omission of second-
ary meaning, when he views them as representing a minority rule 1
Since the Enterprise and Rushmore cases are factually similar and
neither specifically mentions secondary meaning, Callmann's reference
to one case as authority for the majority view and the others as sup-
porting the minority rule seems illogical. Furthermore, if the Enter-
prise case is authority for the majority view, although it does not
specifically identify the requirement of secondary meaning, why
are not the Rushmore cases, which cite the Enterprise decision as
precedent, also representative of the majority rule? It appears that
these cases all support the theory of secondary meaning, and that the
Rushmore doctrine was evolved from subsequent misinterpretations of
the Rushmore cases and of the concept that they embody.
A second decision cited as authority in the Rushmore cases is
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder,92 which does not specifically discuss
secondary meaning, but assumes its existence.
[T]he court can judge of the resemblance between them,
and whether purchasers are likely to be deceived by the resem-
blance ....
[H]is articles are likely to induce purchasers to buy his
padlocks supposing them to be the padlocks of the plaintiff.93
(Emphasis added.)
The court, in the Yale & Towne case, introduces a new language
89 3 Callmann, op. cit. supra note 58, at 1262, fn. 25.
90 Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., op. cit. supra note 14, at 300.
91 3 Callmann, op. cit. supra note 58, at 1263.
92 Supra note 86.
93 Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, op. cit. supra note 86, at 38.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
in the phrase, "likely to be deceived," which formed the essence of
the Rushmore doctrine.
Implicit in "likelihood of deception" is confusion as to source,
since a consumer, to be deceived, must relate the article to the manu-
facturer and confuse its origin or source. "Likelihood of deception"
does not stand alone, but depends upon confusion in the minds of the
consumers. Thus, implicit in deception is confusion, which is another
manifestation of secondary meaning. How can consumers be deceived
into thinking that defendant's goods are of plaintiff's maunfacture
unless they are aware that the plaintiff produces such goods and unless
consumers associate the articles being sold by the defendant with the
plaintiff?
It is the interrelationship of "likelihood of deception" and con-
fusion as to source which brings the Rushmore doctrine within the
framework of secondary meaning. The so-called variance in the
rules result from the nature of proof and not from a difference in
substantive principle. In secondary meaning cases, proof is a pre-
requisite and an essential consideration, while under the deception or
Rushmore doctrine proof of secondary meaning is assumed and need
not be specifically established.
It appears that this assumption arose in the formative decisions,
the Enterprise, the Yale & Towne, and the Rushmore cases, where the
products were nationally known, and where it evidently seemed point-
less to insist upon and to articulate the proof of reputation which was
patently obvious.
This interpretation is substantiated by several decisions in other
circuits. In commenting on the Enterprise and the Yale & Towne
cases, the Seventh Circuit declared that secondary meaning was
assumed to exist in both cases."' The Third Circuit made the following
comment on the Yale & Towne case, indicating that association of
this well-known lock with its source, although not identified in the
opinion through the specific use of the words, "secondary meaning,"
was an important factor:
The Yale lock had a world-wide reputation, and apparently a
large part of the value of defendant's lock consisted in the belief
of the purchaser . . . that the lock was of the Yale & Towne
manufacture.9 5 (Emphasis added.)
It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the Rushmore doc-
trine, formulated from cases which invoked secondary meaning without
specifying it as an existent element, is in accord with the substance
94 Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., op. cit. supra note 14, at 453.
95 John H. Rice & Co. v. Redlich Mfg. Co., 202 Fed. 155, 158 (1913).
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of the majority rule. The early Rushmore doctrine cases involved
well-known articles and secondary meaning was assumed to exist. In
addition, the concept of "likelihood of deception," as embodied in the
Rushmore doctrine, is dependent upon confusion as to source or sec-
ondary meaning for identifiable signification. Thus, secondary meaning
is retained as a salient element.
APPLICATION OF THE RUSHMORE DOCTRINE
When the simulated article is well-recognized by the consuming
public, the application of the Rushmore doctrine has no significant
effect upon the concept of secondary meaning. However, a difficulty
is evident when applying the rule to the copying of less popular
products whose reputations can only be elicited by the introduction
of supporting proof. In these cases, an invoking of the Rushmore
doctrine to prevent the copying of nonfunctional features expands
the range of restrictive practices since, under the majority rule, many
of the less popular products can be freely copied due to an inability
to prove secondary meaning. Removing this obstacle of proof through
an application of the Rushmore doctrine expands the control of
restrictive practices but, at the same time, may foster monopoly. It
is this vexatious conflict which has evoked diverse and tensive dis-
agreement. Carried to an ultimate extreme, as applied to goods of
unknown reputation, the Rushmore rule could preclude the simulation
of nonfunctional features and seriously restrict competition. However,
even the most liberal judicial interpretations require more than mere
prior manufacture of an article to enjoin its imitation.
In Rathbone, Sard & Co. v. Champion Steel Range Co.,96 decided
in 1911 by the Sixth Circuit, the defendant copied all external features
of the plaintiff's stove that had just been introduced on the market.
The appellate court quoted a portion of the district court's opinion
which was rendered on the dismissal of the bill:
At that time it is perfectly obvious that the "Solar Acorn" gas
heater had no reputation whatever. It had established no market.
• . . Whatever may be said of the ethics of this act, the effect of
this appropriation was not to deceive the public, for the public
had no knowledge. . . . Now who could be deceived by any such
operation as that? . . . certainly not the public, for the public
did not know the stoves. In a word, the gist of the offense of
unfair competition, to wit, the selling of the imitating thing as the
imitated thing, does not exist in this case at all.9 7 (Emphasis
added.)
90 189 Fed. 26.
97 Id. at 30.
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The district court recognized that, before deception could take
place, there must be association as to source in the public mind. In
the absence of an established reputation, association as to source can
not be shown.
The plaintiff in the Rathbone case relied almost exclusively on
the Enterprise and the Rushmore cases in presenting its argument.
The prime theory embodied in this presentation was the deception rule
or the Rushmore doctrine. In denying the requested relief, the Sixth
Circuit commented:
The adoption by one manufacturer of the characteristic
features of another's product . . .does not of itself amount to
unfair competition." (Emphasis added.)
We are not called up to determine the correctness of the rule
thus stated [Rushmore] as applied to appropriate facts . .. in
our opinion it can have no application to the facts of this
case .. . taking into account the lack of public knowledge and
reputation of complainant's heater in question .... 01
[P]urchasers more often identify stoves by their name or
the name of the manufacturer, or both, than by appearance
merely; . . .100
Our conclusion, then, in substance, is that complainant has
failed to establish a case of unfair competition, for lack of proof
that defendant has palmed off its goods upon the public as the
goods of complainant.' 01
In applying the Rushmore doctrine, the court affirmed the basic
proposition that the mere imitation of an article alone can not be the
basis for an injunction. Relief will be granted only if there is a like-
lihood of confusion as to the source of the product, creating deception.
Something more than mere simulation must be established. What
constitutes "more"? A synonym for "more" in this context is "de-
ception," which is to be determined by the reputation of the imitated
article and by the resultant, assumed confusion as to its source.
The appellate court stated that the defendant was held to intend
the natural results of his act where those results constituted a "legal
wrong." However, the mere simulation of nonfunctional features does
not produce a natural result which constitutes a "legal wrong"--
unfair competition. Additional factors are essential before a court
can appropriately apply the Rushmore doctrine. In fact, the appellate
court held that it was not called upon to determine the correctness of
the Rushmore rule as applied to appropriate facts since the doctrine
98 Id. at 31.
99 Id. at 32.
100 Ibid.
101 Id. at 33. Here, again, the expanded meaning of "passing off" or "palming off"
is used synonymously with secondary meaning.
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had no application to the facts in the Rathbone case, as the plaintiff's
product had not acquired a reputation.
Judge Lacombe, author of the lower court opinion in the first
Rushmore case, was later elevated to the bench of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. Two of his Second Circuit opinions involved simu-
lation of features and in both cases he relied solely on Rushmore doc-
trine cases as controlling authority.102 The language and substance of
these opinions were similar to the Rushmore cases.
Under the principle of the Rushmore decision, such a manifest
imitation in details of construction, with the consequent likelihood
of confusion should be prevented, unless the points of resemblance
are the necessary result of an effort to comply with the physical
requirements essential to commercial success. 103
In this case, involving an order for a preliminary injunction,
Judge Lacombe decided that the simulated features were nonfunc-
tional, but acknowledged that possibly, at a final hearing, the de-
fendant might be able to show that the copied features were commer-
cially essential, hence functional, and could be freely copied.
But the tentative quality of the ruling, as to the unessentiality
of the copied features, in no way affected the substantive law in the
case. Judge Lacombe simply stated that functional features might
be freely simulated, but that simulation of nonfunctional features,
where there was a likelihood of confusion, ought to be prevented.
Perhaps the obscurantism of the doctrine had its beginning in these
early Lacombe opinions, where, as in this case, he failed to distinguish
between procedural "likelihood of confusion as to source" and pro-
cedural proof of "secondary meaning." In this framework these ele-
ments were commingled so that the assumption of "confusion as to
source") was viewed as an assumption of "secondary meaning," and
"likelihood of confusion as to source" was then treated in its normal
procedural context.
The problem was further aggravated by the free interchange of
the concepts of "likelihood of deception" and "likelihood of confusion"
in the Yale & Towne case and by the introduction of the "likelihood
of deception" principle into the syllabus of the second Rushmore case,
thus obviating the element of proof in secondary meaning. In ad-
dition, the "likelihood" element in relation to deception further
removes the essentiality of actual deception as a requisite for restraint.
Judge Lacombe, from the nature of the simulation, assumed a
probability of the public being misled without identifying the existence
102 Straus v. Well, 191 Fed. 529 (1911); Lovell-McConnell Mfg. Co. v. American
Ever-Ready Co., 195 Fed. 931 (1912).
103 Lovell-McConnell Mfg. Co. v. American Ever-Ready Co., supra note 102.
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of deception. A year later, the same court in Margarete Steiff v.
Bing,10 4 affirmed an order enjoining the simulation of complainant's
toys. Judge Lacombe was one of the three appellate judges who
rendered a per curiam opinion in this case, attaching the text of the
district court opinion which cited the second and third Rushmore cases
as authority. The district court questioned the defendant's simulation
of plaintiff's products,
in order to at least let the public buy the Bing toys under
the impression that they are the complainant's. We have gone very
far in this circuit in the way of enjoining unnecessary imitation
features which are nonfunctional. 105
Here was an initial evolvement of the assumption of secondary meaning
and development of the Rushmore doctrine.
If the consumer bought the Bing toys thinking they were the com-
plainant's, it followed that the consumer knew or was assumed to
know the complainant's product. Thus, secondary meaning is either
proved or assumed to exist. The secondary meaning theory follows the
first approach while the Rushmore doctrine incorporates the assump-
tion of proof of secondary meaning.
In 1916, the Rhode Island federal district court observed:
The complainant cites a number of cases in which the court
apparently has been of the opinion that the copying, in view of
the association of the article copied with a particular manufacturer,
was a means of palming off goods as those of another, and of trading
upon another's reputation.106 (Emphasis added.)
The court then added that no abstract proposition regarding copying
could be made from these Rushmore doctrine cases. Of prime im-
portance, however, is the fact that the court interpreted the Rushmore
doctrine cases as retaining the essential element of secondary meaning.
The object of the law of unfair competition is to prevent "the
palming off" of goods as those of another, deceiving the public, and
trading on a reputation established by another. The district court found
that the plaintiff "failed to show that the goods of its manufacture
'have in fact a distinctive appearance, which in itself points to the
plaintiff as manufacturer.' 10 7 The simulated article, bracelet links,
lacked distinctiveness as to design or function, and the defendant
was permitted to copy both the design and mechanical structure of
-the article, since the company did not seek to trade upon the reputa-
tion established by the complainant. Neither the origin of the goods,
104 206 Fed. 900 (2d Cir. 1913).
105 Id. at 901.
106 Eisenstadt Mfg. Co. v. J. M. Fisher Co., 232 Fed. 957, 960.
107 Id. at 962.
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nor the authorship of the design, nor the reputation of the manu-
facturer were shown to have created such public interest, as to afford
an inducement to the public to buy the plaintiff's goods rather than
the goods of other manufacturers.
In Miller Rubber Co. v. Behrend, Judge Rogers of the Second
Circuit used characteristic Rushmore doctrine language in his opinion,
although he cited no Rushmore doctrine cases. "If the conduct would
deceive the ordinary buyer, making his purchases under the ordinary
conditions, it is unfair competition."' 8 This case, decided eight
months prior to the landmark Second Circuit decision of Crescent
Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co.,109 denied relief to the complainant
against defendant's simulation, since there was no showing that the
defendant's conduct led the public to purchase his goods in the belief
that they were the goods of the plaintiff. The Miller Rubber Co. case,
reflecting the Rushmore doctrine, and the Crescent case are cited in
two later decisions as authority for the majority rule which requires
proof of secondary meaning." 0
A strong refutation of the Rushmore doctrine, as a minority
view, in which secondary meaning is not a required element, is made
by Judge Learned Hand in the Crescent case. He identified the
cases of so-called "nonfunctional" unfair competition, starting with
the "coffee mill" or Enterprise case, as "only instances of the doctrine
of 'secondary' meaning.'
Association in the public mind with the first comer as manufac-
turer or source is an essential factor in the restraint of simulation.
As Judge Hand stated, ". . . it is an absolute condition to any relief
whatever that the plaintiff . . . show that the appearance of his wares
has in fact come to mean that some particular person . . . makes
them, and that the public cares who does make them, and not merely
for their appearance and structure." (Emphasis added.)
Marshaling the authorities, beginning with the Enterprise deci-
sion, Judge Hand identified them as "instances" which support the
doctrine of secondary meaning, where proof of secondary meaning is
an absolute condition to granting any relief. This is the essence of the
majority rule, yet Judge Hand identified the Rushmore doctrine cases
as being in line with this view. Secondary meaning is existent in those
cases even though the courts did not mention it as an element in
granting relief.
108 242 Fed. 515, 518 (1917).
109 Supra note 14.
110 Kxem-Ko Co. v. R. G. Miller & Sons, Inc., 68 F.2d 872 (2d Cir, 1934) and
Electric Auto-Lite So. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1940).
Ill Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., op. dt, supra note 14, at 300.
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A few months after the Crescent decision was issued, but prior
to publication, the federal district court in Connecticut in a famous
Shredded Wheat simulation case stated that the vital question to be
determined was whether the user was liable to be misled, and cited
the Rushmore doctrine cases as authority.112  The Second Circuit
affirmed the result reached by the lower court, but Judge Hand cited
the Crescent case in support of the proposition that no protection
would be given unless plaintiff's design had acquired a secondary
meaning. 3  However, the shape and size of the Shredded Wheat
biscuit were treated as functional, the relief granted being limited to
distinguishing carton marks.
Judge Hand's disapprobation of the Rushmore cases was revealed
in his discussion of them in the Shredded Wheat Co. case.1 4 Citing
the Rushmore doctrine cases, he charged that minor or nonfunctional
changes in appearance may be required, "so long as the substantial
elements are left in the public domain."" 5 Judge Hand described the
second Rushmore case:
as trenching hard upon the other limit in application,
which is that- where the "secondary meaning" is bound up in
elements of the appearance which cannot be changed without
cutting off the defendant's substantial right to make and sell that
kind of goods the plaintiff must suffer the resulting confusion.
These are the converse of the "nonfunctional" cases. 116
A question has been raised as to whether this Rushmore case involved
functional features, since the opinion did not clearly state that the
shell of the imitated lamp was a necessary and functional part of
the lamp.17
Judge Hand distinguished the case from the standard non-
functional features decisions.1 8 However, the Rushmore opinion reveals
that the appellate court relied upon and even quoted from the opinion
of the lower court, in which the features were expressly found to be
nonfunctional. The court identified the simulation of nonfunctional
features as the key issue in the Rushmore case. It is true that the
court indicated that the features might be necessary for the commer-
cial success of the lamp, but there was no connecting link forged
between that finding and its conclusion that the features were func-
112 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 244 Fed. 508, 522 (1917).
113 Supra note 18.
114 Id. at 964.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
1 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 269, 270.
118 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., op. cit. supra note 18, at 964.
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tional. Judge Hand deftly performed this task by applying his buyer's
choice definition of functional features to the Rushmore case." 9
Evidently, Judge Hand has impaled himself on the horns of a
dilemma. The "converse" of nonfunctional cases is functional cases,
in which event Judge Hand is confusing matters by relating secondary
meaning to functional features. This is violative of functional features
and of the doctrine of secondary meaning.
In 1916, the district court for the Southern District of Ohio
granted an injunction in Meccano, Ltd. v. Wagner,'20 restraining the
defendant from simulating the complainant's mechanical toy. Judge
Hollister wrote:
It seems to me that unfair competition exists both under the
aspect of palming off, . . . but also in the more subtle way,
as said by Judge Lacombe, "by simulating the collocation of details
of appearance by which the consuming public has come to recognize
the product of his competitor.' 2 '
Citing the Rushmore doctrine cases in support of this proposition,
Judge Hollister distinguished traditional verbal misrepresentation,
i.e., passing off, from the Rushmore doctrine. Consistent with the
Rushmore doctrine, he assumed the existence of secondary meaning,
commenting "the trade and a large part of the consuming public were
acquainted with complainant's model builder, and the trade and those
of the consuming public who had seen Meccano outfits knew it as of
British make."'12 2 The Meccano case was appealed to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the holding of the lower
court on the matter of unfair competition, in an opinion issued just
three days after the Crescent case. 23
The Second Circuit reviewed another case involving the restraint
of a prominent retail store from buying Meccano toys. In the district
court decision, Judge Augustus N. Hand allowed an injunction on the
119 In Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A. R. Mosler & Co., 233 Fed. 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1916), judge Learned Hand qualifies the meaning of nonfunctional features. He says,
"... nor does it seem an entirely adequate answer to say that the features enjoined
are nonfunctional. It is only when the mechanical operativeness of the thing is certainly
all that determines the buyer's choice that such a criterion is safe." (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 116. Thus, was born the "buyer's choice" theory of functional features. According
to this view, any feature of an article which influences the buyer to purchase it is a
functional feature. Conversely, only those features which do not in any way affect the
buyer's choice can be classified as nonfunctional. If the design and appearance influence
the public to buy an article, then those features are functional, notwithstanding the fact
that they are not essential to the mechanical construction and operation of the article.
120 234 Fed. 912 (1911).
121 Id. at 919.
122 Id. at 917.
123 246 Fed. 603 (6th Cir. 1917).
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authority of the Rushmore doctrine cases and he indicated general
agreement with Judge Hollister's opinion in the Ohio case. 24
The Second Circuit, however, reversed the decision. 25 Judge
Ward, in the majority opinion, quoted Judge Hand's lower court
opinion and made a finding that the features which Wagner copied
were functional and could be freely simulated. The court extrapolated
that if the public associated the toys with the complainant as a source
with resulting confusion, the complainant was entitled to no more
protection than if the toys made by others were to be advertised and
sold as the articles of the makers under their own names and in their
own packages. 20
Two conclusions may be drawn from this case: (1) the court re-
jected the result reached by the Sixth Circuit, Meccano case, the issue
being grounded on the nature of the features rather than on the
existence of secondary meaning, and (2) the court implicitly reaffirmed
the substance of the Crescent case, that secondary meaning is a
required element of proof where nonfunctional features are simulated.
There is an ironic twist in Judge Learned Hand's dissenting
opinion, since he does not question the correctness of the court's
position on the substantive law, but rather argues that the defendant
retailer did not copy plaintiff's toys but merely bought them from
the manufacturer. Judge Hand concluded that permitting the defend-
ant to buy the Wagner toys fosters a violation of the decree of the
Sixth Circuit. In other words, the Second Circuit decision encourages
Wagner to commit a tort under the sanction of its decision; therefore,
regardless of what relief the Second Circuit might have given the
plaintiff upon the same state of facts, an injunction should lie which
recognizes the Sixth Circuit decree. Judge Hand's logic seems persua-
sive.
Another post-Crescent case of the Rushmore type is McGill Mfg.
Co. v. Leviton Mfg. Co.' The district judge stated that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover in an action for unfair competition if the de-
fendant had unnecessarily but unknowingly imitated the plaintiff's
product so that purchasers were likely to be deceived by the similarity.
The Rushmore doctrine cases were cited as authority for this view.
However, the court made these observations:
Due to the distinctive shape and appearance of plaintiff's fix-
tures, they have acquired a secondary meaning ....
124 Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, New York, 241 Fed. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
125 Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, New York, 250 Fed. 450 (1918).
126 Id. at 452.
127 43 F.2d 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1930), aff'd, 44 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1930).
[Vol. 23
1962] UNFAIR TRADE BY PRODUCT SIMULATION 10$
The design ... was not due to any function performing re-
quirements ....
There can be no doubt that confusion exists between plaintiff's
and defendant's devices, and that purchasers are more than likely
to be deceived in buying defendant's devices believing them to be
plaintiff's devices 28
This decision was affirmed on appeal by Judges Learned and Augustus
Hand and Judge Chase of the Second Circuit, resubstantiating the
fact that the Rushmore doctrine cases are in line the majority rule.
The Southern District Court of New York granted a preliminary
injunction in Thayer Telkee Corp. v. Davenport-Taylor Mfg. Co., re-
straining an apparent reproduction of plaintiff's products and citing
the Rushmore doctrine cases and the Crescent case in support of its
action.12' The court ruled:
There is nothing functional in these similarities ....
[I]t can hardly be doubted that a former customer of the
plaintiff . . . would be completely deceived by the appearance
of the defendant's present cabinet, and would probably believe it
to be of the plaintiff's construction.130
Although secondary meaning is not specifically identified, its elements
are given recognizable articulation, thus fusing the Rushmore doctrine
language regarding deception and likelihood of confusion.
In Correct Printing Co., Inc. v. Ramapo River Printing Co.,'
the district court created an additional uncertainty in simulation cases
by stopping short of identification of association as to source. Failing
to identify this association, the court cryptically concluded:
The slavish copying of the size, shape and appearance of the
Correct Company's folder is an unfair practice, designed to confuse
the public on the two products. These elements of the plaintiff's
folder are nonfunctional, and their exact copying may be en-
joined.132
The determination of likelihood of confusion as to the origin or
source of a product is a procedural matter considered after secondary
meaning is established or presumed. Discussing confusion, without
previously having identified association of the product in the public's
mind with the manufacturer, creates an omission or an assumption
in the court's thinking. "Confusion" is assigned the elements of
"deception," as in the Rushmore doctrine. This interchange of terms
128 Id. at 608.
120 46 F.2d 559 (1930).
130 Id. at 560.
131 16 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
132 Id. at 575.
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is the converse of the language used in the Rushmore doctrine; how-
ever, there is no apparent distinction in meaning that can be drawn
between "confusion,") as employed here, and "deception," in its
doctrinal usage.
The Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion in 1937, in citing
the Rushmore doctrine cases, confirmed its earlier position by recog-
nizing deception of the public as concomitant with proof of secondary
meaning. 33 This case was remanded for a new trial because of an un-
certainty as to whether copied features were functional or non-
functional and because secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion
were based solely on insufficient proof of letters and affidavits. By
implication, secondary meaning was designated by the appellate court
as a required element of proof, and the case was consistent with the
majority rule, notwithstanding citation of the Rushmore doctrine cases
as authority.
An opposite position was taken by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in its interpretation of Rushmore doctrine cases. The circuit
court held that secondary meaning was presumed to exist and that
the case did not require its proof.
Counsel for plaintiff bases his argument on four cases [citing
leading Rushmore doctrine cases] . . . . We have considered these
cases and we find that the law stated therein is not applicable to
the instant case. We find that these four cases presuppose that the
appearance of the article had a secondary meaning, and had been
associated in the public mind with the first comer as a manufacturer
or source of supply.' 34 (Emphasis added.)
In 1940, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
allowed an injunction restraining the complete copying of a rake,
in a case where secondary meaning clearly did not exist. 13 5 Judge
Jones, in an oral opinion apparently recognized the majority rule,
but refused to follow it. However, he stipulated that the defendant's
rake should be changed in some respects to avoid confusion.
It may be the rule that in order to establish a distinction in
the trade which shall have the protection of the law in respect of
unfair competition that time is an element. But it does not strike
me that it is exactly fair-and that is what the important word is in
unfair competition law-that one should be permitted to unfairly
compete by copying something which the other person has put
on the market but has not yet reached the point where you could
say it had established a high place with its product.
133 Lektro-Shave Corp. v. General Shaver Corp., supra note 19a.
134 Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., op. cit. supra note 14, at 453.
135 Stampit Corp. v. American Fork & Hoe Co., 44 U.S.P.Q. 22; 45 U.S.P.Q. 644.
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I prefer to have the reviewing court find the erroneous appli-
cation of the rule rather than reverse myself on that.1
36
Judge Jones was obviously disturbed by a situation where the defend-
ant simulated the plaintiff's goods before the goods had acquired
a secondary meaning. However, his decision reflects an economic
philosophy that is in conflict with free competitive practices. It
prescribes a most liberal attitude as to restraint, requiring modification
of a design of an article to ensure distinctiveness of each product.
Whether the ingenuity and imagination of man can provide
a sufficient variety of combinations of features, which by their nature
are mechanically or commercially limited as to style and structure, is
problematic. Although such policy is to be commended, idealistically,
its impracticality renders it unacceptable.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court reversed Judge Jones with
an opinion endorsing the Crescent case and its requirements that the
element of secondary meaning must be proved. 3 7 Unfortunately, the
language of Judge Florence Allen's opinion obscures some of the
subtle distinctions of the articulated doctrine. Judge Allen fails to
differentiate between confusion and deception and attempts to intro-
duce new confusion standards, graded as to probability or possibility,
in lieu of a criterion of likelihood of confusion.
No evidence of actual confusion was presented, but this is not
necessary if confusion or deception is natural or probable as the
result of the resemblance. However, the mere existence of possible
confusion does not give rise to the right of injunction.138
It is apparent that this comment introduces a semantic variation, but
does not impinge on the essence of the majority rule. 3 9
In Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Waldman,140 the
District Court of Pennsylvania gives tacit approval to the argument
that the Rushmore doctrine exists as a separate and distinct theory
of recovery in the law of unfair competition.
With regard to the imitation of nonfunctional features the law
is unsettled. One line of authorities holds that the imitation of
136 Supra note 135, 45 U.S.P.Q. 644-645.
137 American Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F.2d 473 (1942).
138 Id. at 475.
139 Judge Allen also erroneously failed to make an initial determination as to the
functional or nonfunctional nature of the features of the article. She stated that since
secondary meaning was not proved "we need not consider whether the resemblance
between appellant's and appellee's rakes is founded upon functional or non-functional fea-
tures .... ." Id. at 476. Quite the reverse, the nature of the features should first be
elicited, for if the essentiality of the simulated features were established, then, as
functional features, they can be freely copied.
140 69 F. Supp. 646 (1946).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
nonfunctional features is illegal if the similarity is likely to deceive
purchasers (citing Rushmore doctrine cases) . .. and the other
states that one may freely copy the nonfunctional features of the
article if they have not become associated with the original manu-
facturer or source .... The latter which appears to be the weight
of authority springs from the theory that the "cases of so-called
'nonfunctional' unfair competition . ..are only instances of the
doctrine of 'secondary' meaning" (citing the Crescent case).141
It is apparent that the district court is quoting Judge Learned
Hand in the Crescent case. However, if Judge Hand's analysis of
the Rushmore cases is accepted in the Smith case, the substantive
distinction made by the district judge between the Rushmore doctrine
and the majority view is unsupportable. In line with Judge Hand's
thinking, if a distinction exists it should be identified as a procedural
deviation from the majority rule rather than as a "line of authority"
forming a new substantive principle.
Additional support for the proposition that secondary meaning
is an assumed element in the Rushmore doctrine is supplied by Unique
Arts Mfg. Co., Inc. v. T. Cohn, Inc."'
The required showing in the copying of nonfunctional features
[citing Rushmore doctrine cases] . ..as expounded in Crescent
Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co. . . .is generally to the effect
that what is now known as a secondary meaning is requisite.14
(Emphasis added.)
The court implied that the same element, now designated as "second-
ary meaning," was present in the Rushmore doctrine cases, although
it was unnamed in them.
The Commissioner of Patents also favored the assumption theory
as applied to the Rushmore doctrine cases, recognizing that "In these
cases [Rushmore] . . . the matter considered was apparently the
imitation of certain characteristic 'nonfunctional' features of the
articles which were considered to have acquired a secondary
meaning. ' ' 144
Another controversial simulation decision is West Point Mfg. Co.
141 Id. at 647.
142 81 F. Supp. 742 (E.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 178 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1949). In a
brief per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decree;
however, the action was affirmed expressly on the authority of the Crescent, Shredded
Wheat and Cheney Bros. cases-the Rushmore doctrine cases having been omitted. The
omission apparently was intentional, perhaps to avoid taking a stand on the Rushmore
doctrine cases.
143 Id. at 745.
144 Ex parte Mars Signal-Light Co., 85 U.S.P.Q. 173, 175 (1950).
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v. Detroit Stamping Co.,14 a Sixth Circuit decree, which followed the
traditional majority rule. The court ruled that the copied features
were functional and therefore could be freely copied. Despite this
finding, the court, in obiter dicta discussed at length the reasons that
the complainant could not recover even if one assumed the features
to be nonfunctional. The court's reasoning created further confusion
as is evident from an examination of the case.
On expiration of the plaintiff's patent on "toggle clamps," the
defendant copied the clamps, but utilized its own trade-mark. The
complainant sought an injunction, restraining the simulation, based on
the Rushmore theory that consumers were likely to be deceived. The
district court granted the injunction, holding that the appearance of
the clamp was nonfunctional, that it had acquired a secondary
meaning, and that there was a likelihood of confusion as to source.
However, the district court ignored the essence of the plaintiff's
pleading which related to the Rushmore doctrine, following the major-
ity rule. The Sixth Circuit reversed and denied the injunction, relying
primarily on the Crescent and American Fork and Hoe cases. The
court accepted the existence of the Rushmore doctrine as a distinct
rule but rejected it as contrary to the great weight of authority. The
processes of the court's thinking are discernible in excerpts from the
opinion.
Much is said in cases of unfair competition . . . about the
"confusion" of the public. In some instances, references to such
confusion would seem to imply that if the article copied is identical
to the original article, the public, not being able to tell the
difference between the two articles, is confused; and that, since
the copier is the cause of such confusion, he is accordingly guilty
of unfair competition. That is not the law. . . . It is rather
confusion as to origin, not of goods, which controls on the question
of unfair competition ... .146 (Emphasis added.)
Although the court did not cite any cases relating to "confusion,"
it is reasonable to assume that the Rushmore doctrine cases were
weighed.
In an elaborate footnote at the conclusion of the opinion, the
court cited the traditional Rushmore doctrine cases, with this analysis:
The foregoing cases seem to emphasize what the court felt was
the unfairness of defendant's appropriation of plaintiff's ideas and
features of construction, and the identical copying of them; and
this consideration seems to lie at the basis of decision in those
cases, rather than any proof that the defendants palm off their
145 222 F.2d 581 (1955), reversing, 122 F. Supp. 741 (E.D. Mich. 1954), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 840 (1955).
146 Id. at 589.
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products as those of plaintiffs, or caused the public to believe that
their articles came from plaintiffs, which is the criterion now gen-
erally adopted. 47 (Emphasis added.)
To epitomize, the court inferred that the Rushmore doctrine was a
true minority view based on mere simulation without the requisite
elements of secondary meaning or confusion as to source. In this
context, "confusion" means an inability on the part of consumers
to distinguish between articles. This creates a likelihood of deception
and copying becomes enjoinable.
In the West Point case, Judge McAllister erroneously identified
the Rushmore doctrine cases with "confusion" created by the similarity
of articles rather than with "confusion" as to the source of the
original article. Even under the Rushmore cases, products may be
indistinguishable and yet not fall within an enjoinable proscription.
Mere confusion of products is not a ground for relief under this
doctrine. Hence, Judge McAllister was inaccurate when he concluded:
What has been said disposes of appellee's chief contention which
is addressed to the proposition that where a manufacturer engages
in the unnecessary imitation of the nonfunctional parts of the
product of a competitor to the extent that the two articles are
substantially identical in appearance, and retail purchasers are thus
likely to mistake one for another, he is chargeable with unfair
competition, [citing Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers . . . ; Yale
& Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder . . . ; and Rushmore v. Manhattan
Screw & Stamping Works. . .. ]148 (Emphasis added.)
Judge McAllister could have disposed of the Rushmore doctrine cases
with more precision by stating that the Rushmore doctrine is a proce-
dural deviation from the majority rule and does not support the
proposition that mere simulation, without more, will be enjoined in
instances in which purchasers are likely to mistake one product for
another.
Although the originative precedents of the Rushmore doctrine are
doubtful interpretation and no documentary support can be found
for the rule in the early cases, certain conclusions are elicitable. The
original Rushmore doctrine cases embodied the elements of secondary
meaning where its proof was assumed because the products possessed
national reputations, and the decisions contained no doctrinal novelty.
So-called conceptual innovation developed subsequently, with depar-
tures from the majority rule being formalistic rather than substantive.
Thus it appears that secondary meaning remains a salient factor under
the Rushmore doctrine, since likelihood of deception is based on con-
147 Id. at 599.
148 Id. at 597-598.
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fusion as to the source of the simulating product and not on more
direct factors, such as confusion between the products.
CONCLUSION
In encouraging competitive activity, courts have generally ruled
that mere simulation of nonfunctional features does not constitute en-
joinable conduct under the law of unfair competition. But, they have
restrained product imitation, involving nonfunctional features, where
the appearance of the article has become associated in the public mind
with the first comer as manufacturer and where a likelihood of con-
fusion as to its origin may ensue. However, formidability of proof
invited presumptions in establishing secondary meaning, with resultant
doctrinal uneveness. Distinctions arose without apparent conceptual
bases, creating the Rushmore doctrine and more recently the dis-
claimed fraudulent marketing theory.
Although the objective of the law of product simulation is to de-
termine the manner of business activity and not to curtail competitive
action, the law embodies such a melange of policies and variable
criteria that it makes for uncertainty and confusion as to the very
activities it seeks to promote. This welter of judicial decision suggests
a need for a reevaluation of the law of unfair competition, conceivably
in line with competitive criteria which do not foster monopolistic
control and with a higher plane of business morality. Differentiation
of products, rather than the mutual exclusivity of monopoly and
competition, could conceivably form the basis of marketing standards.
